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The Cost of a Vote: Examining Legislative Incentives in an Election Year 
Abstract 
Leading up to 2020 elections, North Carolina ended a historically long legislative session in 
political gridlock and without passing a budget. While a large literature examining voter 
behavior exists, the impact of legislation passing in an election year on the incumbent party’s 
likelihood for reelection remains poorly understood. We exploit a novel dataset that links the 
voter affiliation and voter behavior of government workers with state wage increases. A 
difference-in-difference strategy is applied to a sample of municipal workers who serve as a 
baseline group to state workers who received wage increases. Movements in voter alignment, 
relative to the incumbent governor’s party, are examined to better understand the incentive of 
passing or contesting legislation that impacts the large voting block of state employees. 
Introduction 
There are many different factors that can affect an individual’s voting habits. Within these 
characteristics, we might see an impact on a voter’s likelihood to vote for one party or even their 
likelihood to vote at all. Traditional examples may observe demographic facts about voters such 
as their race, age, sex, education, and income. Papers such as Income Inequality and Partisan 
Voting in the United States by Gelman, Kenworthy, and Su look at these trends over a long 
period of time in the U.S. While their results were inconclusive, there are interesting trends 
examined particularly when looking at the education and income variables. As a generality, it is 
often shown that richer individuals are more likely to vote Republican, while more educated 
individuals are more likely to vote Democrat (Gelman, Kenworthy, and Su 2010). 
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This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by looking at the effects of a wage increase as a 
shock to voting habits. Individuals may not actually be shifting in income groups to have an 
effect that would by strictly an income effect. Instead, this paper would look to see if a wage 
increase (specifically for state employees) would have a short-term impact on voting habits. If it 
proves to be correct, it could provide insight into the incentives legislators have when approving 
changes during or leading up to an election year. 
Methods 
This paper will address the idea of a wage increase as a shock to voting habits by using the 
difference in differences method to see the impact of the 2016 raises for state employees in NC. 
By using Pitt County as a case study for wage increases, we will be able to view the effects of 
the wage increase on state educators’ (ECU faculty and staff) voting habits with a control group 
of non-educator residents. Stata 16.1 will be used to analyze the data and to run the regression 
equations.  
Difference in Difference 
According to a description from Columbia University, “DID is a quasi-experimental design that 
makes use of longitudinal data from treatment and control groups to obtain an appropriate 
counterfactual to estimate a causal effect. DID is typically used to estimate the effect of a 
specific intervention or treatment (such as a passage of law, enactment of policy, or large-scale 
program implementation) by comparing the changes in outcomes over time between a population 
that is enrolled in a program (the intervention group) and a population that is not (the control 




Figure 1 Standard Difference in Difference (Columbia University) 
 
Data Sets  
Looking at data from Pitt County, there were 8 different data sets used to create the necessary 
groups for both control and intervention. The two largest data sets from these were the Pitt 
County Registered Voter data set and the Pitt County Voter History data set. The other six data 
sets were for the various different types of employees within the county. These were ECU 
Faculty and Staff, Greenville Fire and Rescue, Greenville Public Works, Greenville Parks and 
Rec, Greenville Police, and Pitt County Teachers and Staff. Before the data could be used as one 
body to analyze the wage increases, they had to be combined to a useable fashion.  
The Pitt County Registered Voter data set contains both names and voter registration numbers, 
while the Pitt County Voter History only contains voter registration numbers and the various 
employee data sets only contain names. Thus, two different merges were used to put the 
information together. First, there was a 1:1 merge based on the individual’s name with the 
employee data sets and the Pitt County Registered Voter data set. A 1:1 merge is able to be used 
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here as there should be a specific match to the individual based on their name. While Second, 
there was a 1:m merge with the Pitt County Voter History data set using voter registration 
numbers. For this merge, a 1:m merge makes as there will be multiple instances of an 
individual’s voter registration number showing up in the Pitt County Voter History data set to 
account for them voting on multiple occasions.  
These two merges resulted in having the necessary information together, but only as far as the 
different employee groups were concerned. To put them all back together for regressions, the six 
different groups were appended. This created a “vertical” stack of information that could then be 
used. As each group contained a unique group of people, the append function could be 
successfully used.  
Dummy Variables  
The typical setup of a difference in difference regression in Stata is: 
𝑟𝑒𝑔 (𝑑𝑒𝑝 𝑣𝑎𝑟)  (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒)  (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒)  (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚) 
The results for this come in the form: 
 
Figure 2 Regression Output Formula 
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While the dependent variable could be a number of different variables (as discussed in the 
Results section), the two dummy variables and interaction term must be created to represent the 
shock of the wage increases in 2016. Dummy variables take the value of either 1 or 0 to 
represent whether or not a certain action has been taken. 
The first dummy variable created was the treatment variable. This represents the wage increase 
shock. The 2016 Appropriations Act (HB 1030) was passed on 7/1/16. Therefore, our dummy 
variable needs to equal 1 for elections that occur after this date. However, all of the elections are 
referenced in the data with text-based descriptions as seen below.  
 
Figure 3 Elections 
To get past this issue, I created another variable, year, in order to ascribe a numeric year value to 
each of these different elections. All of the different elections were given a specific year, with the 
exception being the 11/08/2016 General election as this was the only election to occur after the 
bill was passed, but before the end of the year. With the year variable created, the first dummy 
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variable, treatment, could also be created by having it set equal to 1 whenever year was 2016.5 
or greater. 
 
Figure 4 Intermediary Dummy Variable (Year) 
The second dummy variable to be created is state_worker. Among our data sets, ECU faculty 
and staff are our group of state workers This variable was quite easy to create after some 
searching through the data. The ECU Faculty and Staff data set had a unique identifier variable, 
ECU. At first glance, it looked like this could have been used as our dummy variable without 
alteration, but the ECU variable only had the positive value of 1 for each member of the data set. 
Therefore, it wouldn’t be able to be used to look at the rest of the employees in the appended 
data set as easily. I created a second dummy variable state_worker to have the distinction very 






The final step in creating variables to run the DID regression was to create the interaction 
term between the two dummy variables. This was done by simply setting the 
interaction_term variable equal to treatment x state_worker.  
Expected Results 
At the conclusion of our DID analysis, we expect to see that state workers will be more likely to 
vote in favor of the party that approved the 2016 wage increases (Governor’s party) than they 
were before the wage increase. In addition to this, there is likely to be some amount of spillover 
to other residents in that are amiable towards educators and other state employees. This will be 
seen in our examination of the control group of non-educator residents.  
Additional results to be expected is that there will be a higher voter turnout after the proposed 
wage increases to represent residents interested in supporting further wage increases. However, 
there is some negative relationship implied here, as mentioned in Employment, Wages, and Voter 
Turnout by Charles and Stephens. As a resident’s wage increases, so does their opportunity cost 
for going out to vote as there is more associated value with them staying at work (Charles and 
Stephens 2011). With that said, the wage increases are more likely to cause a short-term shock 
and thus will not create the same sort of income effect. 
 




Analysis of Individuals who Voted Republican (Governor’s Party) 
After first approaching this topic, I realized that I had made a mistake in my assumptions. It had 
looked like the wage increase resulted in voters following the anticipated result of voting in favor 
of the party who had approved the wage increase. However, the wage increase was passed in 
July, 2016. Gov. Cooper was elected in 2016, but he didn’t take office until 2017. With a 
Republican majority in both the House and Senate at the time, this means that the wage increases 
came from a largely Republican appropriations bill. In fact, not a single Republican voted against 
the bill in its passage 91-22.  
Adjusting our regression to have new variables for voted_rep and a new interaction term, we get 
the results shown below. What you’ll see in these regressions, as opposed to the one illustrated in 
the next section looking at unaffiliated voters who voted Democrat, is that all of our variable 
coefficients are negative. We’re showing that after the timeline of our shock, you’re having 
fewer unaffiliated state workers voting Republican. These results are not what we expected when 
thinking about the issue intuitively. It would make sense for there to be an increase in support for 
the party that made the wage increases, but that was not the case. Some examples of explanations 





Figure 7 voted_rep Regression 
 
Regression in Favor of Democratic Party  
As mentioned above, the initial regressions run mistakenly looked at the Democratic Party. 
While the party in control at the time of the wage increase was the Republican Party, there is still 
information to be learned by looking at how voters responded to the shock in relation to the 
Democratic Party (which many educators are affiliated with). 
Like the regression looking at the Republican Party, this regression restricted the regression to 
voters who were registered as “unaffiliated.” This helps control for existing biases and to look at 
what sort of effect the wage increase would have on “unaffiliated voters. This regression’s 
results lined up much better with our anticipated results. With a positive .133358 coefficient for 
the interaction_term variable. This means that roughly 13% of unaffiliated members of ECU 
faculty and staff voted for the Democratic party after the wage increases of 2016. As the shock to 
the system is more likely to affect unaffiliated voters, this makes sense to see a better fit to our 
model. However, despite this matching our expected results, it is incorrect for the shock that we 




Figure 8 Regression 2 (Unaffiliated) 
 
Conclusion/Why It Matters 
This issue matters because of the implications it has should there be a direct relationship between 
legislative policy on wage increases and voter turnout/voting behavior. While there are certainly 
a great deal of factors that contribute to an individual’s voting habits, this one is of particular 
importance as it represents legislator’s ability to “buy” votes by altering their legislative behavior 
during election years. Furthermore, it is important to look at whether any effects from these 
changes stay localized within that particular year, or if there is a spillover effect to be seen for a 
period of time after the income shock. 
Looking at our results, we didn’t see what we expected to happen. As mentioned above, the 
intuitive thought is that there would be an increase in support for the party behind the wage 
increase. This was not the case. Does it mean that there isn’t validity to the idea? Not necessarily, 
as there are a number of factors that could create a separate shock to the voting system. 
Furthermore, educators have a tendency to lean Democrat in general, so there could be an 
inherent bias even on the unaffiliated voters.  
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Wage Increase Timeline 
While there have been a number of raises for state employees and teachers over time, it is 
important to look at when a number of these raises fell. There are specific amount raises that 
have occurred in the off years, but when looking percentage increases from the past 10 years or 
so, we see standouts in 2008 and 2012, in addition to the discussed increases in 2016. With 2008 
and 2012 being election years, and notably there being no raises in the four years between them, 
it would seem that legislators have seen wage increases as an incentive to voters, even if our 
sample didn’t show it. If we view educators as individuals who do have a bias towards 
Democrats, it would seem that the wage increases consistently falling on election years would be 
an effort by a Republican-controlled House and Senate to gain votes. 
 




House Bill 2 
When looking at our results, we see that there was a positive result with individuals voting more 
for Democrats after the 2016 mark. If this still served as a shock in the voting pattern, it begs the 
question of what is the correct shock if the wage increase does not line up with it. That is, was 
there another event in 2016 that could have had a larger effect on voting behavior than the wage 
increase. My proposed answer to this is House Bill 2. House Bill 2 (Public Facilities Privacy and 
Security Act) was passed in March, 2016. This means that it would fall in the same timeline for 
everything from our initial regression, except for the June, 2016 Congressional Primary. The 
fallout of HB2 was a lot of negative feedback on both NC and the Republican party based in NC. 
Given the nature of this bill and its effect on many students at the time, it’s likely that many 
educators would have felt strongly on the subject and may have cast their votes against it in the 
upcoming election. In fact, we saw Gov. Cooper use the fallout of HB2 as part of his campaign 
that led to his victory over the incumbent, Pat McCrory. With this line of reasoning, it would 
make sense for the Republicans to have offered the raises within the Appropriations Act as a way 
to try and keep some of the swing voters in their favor.  
Research Moving Forwards 
While the regressions run did not match our expected results, they did seem to indicate some 
spillover effect onto voters who were not directly affected by the wage increase. Moving 
forwards, work could be done to pinpoint this spillover effect to see what the nature of it is. 
Looking at why impacted voters did not vote in favor of the party who passed the wage increase, 
it is possible that the wages were not as much as they would have liked. Additional reasons for 
our results could be voters of a particular party voting strategically in the opposite primary. It 
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also brings up the question regarding our sample of Pitt County and how well the state 
employees in this county are representative for the state. 
A couple things that can be done in the future to look at this effect further would be to look at 
another county’s data. With enough different counties’ data, we could see a more generalized 
effect. The main importance with this sort of testing going forwards would be sure that the same 
type of workers are included from each county so as to not introduce additional biases. 
Another idea for moving forward would be to adjust our shock point to previous election years. 
Seeing as there were similar wage increases in 2008 and 2012, it would be interesting to see how 
the measured effect of a wage increase changed from election year to election year. This would 
also let us view the effect more broadly as voting for an incumbent in general as opposed to a 
party. The regressions in this study had to be viewed from a party standpoint as the party of the 
incumbent shifted during the timeframe of the data. By shifting the shock points, we could see if 
there was a difference in support of wage increases based on which party was approving the 
wage increases. 
2020 Elections 
Looking at the patterns from the past three elections and given the drawn-out nature of the 
current political atmosphere, it would be reasonable to predict that we would see another set of 
raises passed within the next appropriations bill. This would match up with the pattern we have 
observed and aid a Republican effort to unseat Gov. Cooper. The only caveat to this prediction is 
that with the Covid-19 pandemic, you may see funds distributed in different ways to try to help 
with the relief efforts. This will provide a huge shock to the upcoming elections, especially as the 
various parties take actions to help deal with the consequences of the situation. As the budget is 
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passed, we will have the opportunity to see real time whether there is a legislative effort to sway 
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